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Abstract
Perfect risk sharing is not an optimal design for the financial system because
it can increase systemic risk by facilitating risk contagion among financial in-
stitutions. However, risk sharing dominates betting according to most Pareto
efficiency criteria. One reason for this might be that those Pareto criteria
consider individual risk rather than systemic risk and neglect that betting
may reduce systemic risk by segmenting the financial system and prevent-
ing financial contagion. Refining Pareto criterion to cover systemic risk, I
propose the systemic Pareto criterion which has two features: 1) satisfying
facts that betting dominates risk sharing when systemic risk is considered.
2) being applicable to scenarios with the constant aggregate endowment to
which current criteria cannot provide compelling suggestions. One implica-
tion from this paper is that betting can act as the stabilizer of the economy
and prohibiting betting is not always helpful for financial stability.
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1. Introduction
The view that perfect risk sharing is the optimal allocation has been
widely held by economists for a long time. However, since the 2007/08 U.S.
financial crisis, a growing body of literature has pointed out that perfect risk
sharing can undermine the financial stability by allowing risk propagating
among financial network and increasing systemic risk. For example, Stiglitz
(2010a,b) questions if full integration or full risk sharing is always desirable
for the financial system and concludes that risk sharing is not the optimal
financial architecture due to the high probability of system-wide failure. Ace-
moglu et al. (2015) argues that whether a more complete financial network is
better or not depends on the magnitude and the number of negative shocks.
The similar view is also held by Dasgupta (2004), Allen et al. (2012), Bat-
tiston et al. (2012) and Castiglionesi et al. (2017).
Traditionally, risking sharing is encouraged because it can diversify indi-
vidual risk. However, the incentive of diversification also makes the financial
institutions more interconnected or homogenous and increases the systemic
risk. This tension between the two roles is also discussed by Beale et al.
(2011) and Haldane and May (2011).
Another reason that risk sharing is welcomed may come from the equiv-
alence of Pareto optima and risk sharing, which is discussed by Back (2010).
If the agents are risk averse and homogenous in beliefs about the uncertainty,
risk sharing naturally arises from the Pareto optimal allocation. Although
the standard Pareto optimality criterion faces difficulties under heteroge-
neous belief conditions and has been modified to various forms, the risk
sharing allocation is still optimal according to those criteria. This is the
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problem I attempt to solve, thus I propose a Pareto criterion on systemic
risk under which risk sharing can be dominated by betting. The intuition
behind the ranking is that risk sharing increases systemic risk while betting
reduces it.
In addition to the ”risk sharing always wins” issue, another trouble that
standard Pareto criterion encounters is mentioned by Hammond (1981) and
Nielsen (2003, 2018). Since the ex-ante Pareto efficient allocation may not
be ex-post optimal due to the overconfidence or information misperception of
agents, those studies suggest that substituting the standard (ex-ante) Pareto
criterion with ex-post welfare optimality. However, as Mongin (2016) crit-
icizes, the distinctions between ex-ante and ex-post Pareto optimality are
”between differing and identical subjective probabilities rather than between
two temporal stages of analysis” and ”the ex-post Pareto principle is in-
tended to serve at the ex-ante stage”. In this paper, I have no intention of
going further into those arguments but respect the traditions that making
the welfare comparison at the ex-ante stage.
From ex-ante perspective, Gilboa et al. (2014) and Brunnermeier et al.
(2014) refine the standard Pareto criterion and propose their versions of
Pareto efficiency— no-betting Pareto and belief-neutral Pareto criteria. They
both favor risk sharing which is more efficient in their views and disapprove
betting which could cause ex-post inefficiency or negative externality. Their
conclusions contradict with mine because they do not take systemic risk into
account. For example, the derivatives backed by the housing values were
shared by the markets in the United States in 2007 and most people agreed
on that housing prices will rise in the future (see Foote et al. (2012)). The
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risk-sharing allocation based on similar beliefs seems fine from the above
criteria, but in fact, it contained great systemic risk and betting on housing
prices could reduce this risk.
In addition, I follow this strand of research and assume that the social
planner does not know the objective (true) probability and take no stand
when the agents hold heterogenous beliefs. The reasons why heterogenous
beliefs arise are various, such as irrationality of agents, different background
or experience and distortions in updating(see Brunnermeier et al. (2014)).
Whatever the reasons may be, the planner cannot use a ”presentative” belief
to make welfare comparisons. This plausible assumption makes our analysis
necessary, or else the planner is able to use the only correct probability to
measure social welfare. Since my work is closely related to theirs, I will leave
the further discussion for Section 4.
Another strand of literature related to mine is the utilitarian aggrega-
tion of individual preference. Harsanyi (1955) shows that a standard Pareto
condition holds if and only if the utility function of society can be presented
by a convex average of individuals’ utility function when they hold homoge-
nous beliefs about uncertainty. Gilboa et al. (2004) extends this axiom under
Savage (1972)’s framework where all agents are Subjective Expected Utility
(SEU) maximizer but restrict the Pareto condition to the alternatives on
which agents hold identical beliefs. Furthermore, Alon and Gayer (2016)
and Danan et al. (2016) also aggregate preferences of individuals under var-
ious restricted Pareto conditions which, however, cannot accommodate the
heterogeneity in belief and utility simultaneously.
In this paper, I follow the tradition of Gilboa et al. (2014) and focus
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on decentralized decisions making under heterogenous beliefs without the
intention of providing complete social ranking by aggregating preferences of
individuals.
2. Example
In this section, I will give a dilemma that cannot be perfectly solved by
recent Pareto criteria proposed by Brunnermeier et al. (2014) and Gilboa
et al. (2014). And then I will show how the systemic Pareto criterion I
propose solves it.
The Kings dilemma:2
Two kingdoms stand next to each other. A bad king rules one of them
and has a daughter. To assure the princess will marry to the strongest man,
he announces that he will marry his daughter to the winner of the contest.
A good king rules another kingdom and he has two sons, Aaron and Ben.
They can choose to attend the contest or not and then there would be three
potential outcomes for each of them: (no attendance, attendance and suc-
cess, attendance and defeat). Suppose for each prince, the payoffs over the
outcomes are the same:(0, 1,−1). If Aaron and Ben are very confident (but
no one knows the exact probability of the outcomes) to triumph in the con-
test, then they would like to try their luck provided the expected payoffs are
high enough. Assume the good king is Paretian and should he let his sons
attend the contest?
2This example is adapted from Nielsen (2018).
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If he decides to respect the will of Aaron and Ben and let them go (to bet),
he will have to accept the ”one win and one lose” consequence which violates
the Pareto principle at the ex-post stage. This scenario named ”spurious
unanimity” has been studied by Gilboa et al. (2014) and Mongin (2016).
Otherwise, he will hurt the feelings of his sons and reject the potential Pareto
improvement in the ex-ante stage.
No-betting and belief-neutral Pareto criteria are two recent accomplish-
ments in Pareto efficiency refinement under heterogenous beliefs. Next, I will
show that they cannot provide compelling answers for the good king.
2.1. No-betting Pareto criterion
For two allocations f and g, no-betting Pareto reckons that f dominates
g if 1) all agents involved prefer f to g under their subjective beliefs and 2)
there exists a hypothetical probability which can rationalize the preference.
Suppose the princes are risk neutral and maximizing expected utilities
with respect to their subjective probabilities and a hypothetical probability
over (Aaron wins, Ben wins) is (p, 1 − p). It is easy to show that no such
hypothetical belief can rationalize their options of attending the contest.
Because Aaron’s decision to go requires that p ∗ 1 − (1 − p) ∗ 1 > 0 while
Ben’s decision to go requires that (1− p) ∗ 1− p ∗ 1 > 0. No-betting Pareto
criterion excludes the option of letting them go owing to no common beliefs
shared by the princes and suggests that the good king should not support
their decisions of betting.
The underlying assumption for this suggestion is that ex-post efficiency
is more important than ex-ante efficiency. However, compared with the cost
of neglecting ex-ante efficiency and ensuring ex-post efficiency (which is hard
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to measure), it might be less costly to ensure ex-ante efficiency and remedy
the ex-post inefficiency by proper transfer plans (i.e., the good king ask the
winning son give his fortune to the losing son). In such sense, no-betting
Pareto criterion does not offer a compelling suggestion for the good king.
2.2. Belief neutral Pareto criterion
For two allocations f and g, belief neutral Pareto views that f dominates
g if for every belief p in the convex hull of beliefs of all agents, every agent
weakly prefers f to g and at least one agent strictly prefers f to g.
Assume that Aaron and Ben are both 90% certain of winning in the
contest and (λ, 1 − λ), where 0 < λ < 1, are weights of beliefs assigned to
Aaron and Ben. Then the linear combination of their beliefs over (Aaron
wins, Ben wins) is (0.8λ + 0.1,0.9− 0.8λ). For every belief in the belief set,
the expected utilities of betting for Aaron and Ben are (0.8λ + 0.1) ∗ 1 −
(0.9 − 0.8λ) = 1.6λ − 0.8 and (0.9 − 0.8λ) ∗ 1 − (0.8λ + 0.1) = 0.8 − 1.6λ,
respectively. Apparently, they cannot be positive or negative at the same
time, which means that the allocation of betting is neither dominating nor
being dominated by the allocation of no betting. Therefore, belief-neutral
Pareto criterion cannot offer advice for the good king.3.
2.3. Systemic Pareto criterion
Here I will show how the systemic Pareto criterion solves this dilemma
by adding extra disturbance. The King’s dilemma may remind us of game
theory where multiple Nash equilibriums arise and we only need the most
3This is the incompleteness of belief-neutral Pareto criterion and more details can be
found in Brunnermeier et al. (2014)
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reasonable one—the perfect equilibrium. Next, I apply the spirit of trembling
hand perfect equilibrium4 to solve the dilemma. Assume the irritable bad
king may lose his temper with a small probability ε > 0. When he gets angry,
he could aggress upon the good king if none of his sons attend the contest or
break his promise even if the princes complete the contest, with the results
that Aaron and Ben both receive the worst payoff −c ≤ −1. Now the set
of potential outcomes is (no attendance and no invasion, no attendance and
invasion, attendance and Aaron wins, attendance and Ben wins, attendance
and no one wins). And the corresponding payoffs for Aaron and Ben are
(0,−c, 1,−1,−c) and (0,−c,−1, 1,−c), respectively. The expected payoff of
not going for them is
(1− ε) ∗ 0 + ε ∗ (−c) = −c ∗ ε
According to the persistent belief (see, for example, Battigalli and Bonanno
(1997) and Ko and Huang (2012)), people are reluctant to adjust their beliefs
when new information is unfavorable to their priors. Back to this example,
the possibility of the bad king going mad changes from 0 to ε and this
shock should have a negligible effect on the beliefs of winning for Aaron
and Ben (since they are quite sure of their victory). Thus Aaron’s belief on
(attendance and Aaron wins, attendance and Ben wins, attendance and no
one wins) would be (0.9, 0.1− ε, ε) and the same adjustment is for Ben. The
expected payoff of betting for them is
0.9 ∗ 1− (0.1− ε)− ε ∗ c = 0.8 + ε− c ∗ ε
4Since the bad king is not a player, this is not the exact trembling hand refinement in
game theory.
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Table 1: Aaron’s (Ben’s) strategy
Alternatives Expected payoffs Loss caused by shock
Beting 0.8 + ε− c ∗ ε c ∗ ε− ε
No beting −c ∗ ε c ∗ ε
Comparison 0.8 + ε− c ∗ ε > −c ∗ ε c ∗ ε− ε < c ∗ ε
Compared with the original story, the chance of the bad king going mad
reduces the payoffs of Aaron and Ben regardless of their choices, but the
extents to which the payoffs are reduced are different. If the good king
prevents his sons from attending the contest, the payoffs reduced for each
prince is 0 + c ∗ ε = c ∗ ε. If not, the payoffs reduced for each prince is
0.8− (0.8+ε−c∗ε) = c∗ε−ε. Clearly, payoffs decease greater if the princes
do not bet and the difference of reduced payoffs can help the good king make
the decision. The analysis is summarized in Table 1.
In addition to the welfare of his sons, the good king also cares about
the changes caused by the ”trembling hands”. Intuitively, the society wants
the potential negative shock has the small, rather than large, effect on peo-
ple’s expectation. For example, although unpredictable earthquake or disease
outbreaks may happen with a very small probability tomorrow, it should be
better for everyone to neglect it and live normally. In the same sense, the
good king should allow his sons to attend the contest because they would
suffer less expected utility loss in that situation.
This is how I incorporate systemic risk into the Pareto principle. From
utilitarian perspectives, the social planner only cares about the level of utility
of the agents. However, the variance of utilities of the agents also matters
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when the ”King’s dilemma” arises. The variance represents the risk of the
whole system because the smaller the variances are for every agent, the more
resilient the system is.
Here I interpret this example: Aaron and Ben represent two parties who
want to bet; The good king is the social planner or government who cares
about the welfare of each party and the systemic risk; The bad king signifies
the economy or nature. Nature is hardly predictable so that we can never
reject the possibility that a disaster happens and we get the worst results
(i.e., Aaron and Ben get −c when the bad king goes mad). The negligible
possibility serves as the trembling hands in Nash equilibriums and helps the
planner find the efficient allocation for each one without comparing the ex-
ante and ex-post efficiencies. Betting dominates risk sharing because betting
reduces systemic risk, which can be seen from the example—Aaron and Ben
are less affected by the idea of the crazy king when they bet.
3. Model
After the informal illustration, I will present the systemic Pareto criterion
formally in this section.
3.1. Setup
The environment setup in this paper is similar to that of Gilboa et al.
(2014). There is a measurable state space (S,Σ) and an outcomes set X.
The mappings from S to X are contained in an acts set F . The set N =
{1, 2, ..., n} contains all the agents in the society and each agent i ∈ N
has a preference relation %i over F . The preference %i is characterized by
maximizing
∫
S
ui(f(s))dpi, where ui is a utility functions mapping X to R
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and pi is a probability measure on (S,Σ). In addition, there is no aggregate
uncertainty in society, which means the total wealth of society is constant
until the ”trembling hands” reduces the total wealth.
3.2. Pareto criterion
Now I will give the formal definition that appeared in the previous exam-
ple. First, I define belief persistence as follows:
Definition 1. An agent is belief persistent if the probability assigned to a
new state rise from 0 to ε > 0 and the probability of the favored state which
he thought was most likely to happen would not change.
For example, in King’s Dilemma, Aaron and Ben are belief persistent
because the probability of bad king going crazy increases from 0 to ε but
they still believe that they will win with the probability 0.9. In other words,
the king going crazy and losing the contest seem the same for them so those
two events share the probability assigned previously to losing the contest.
That agents are belief persistent is a strong assumption but can be relaxed
by allowing the shock has a larger effect on the probability of unfavored
states. What follows is the definition of another essential concept—systemic
risk.
Definition 2. Given all agents are belief persistent, for two allocations f
and g, f involves less systemic risk than g if the inclusion of a new state,
the probability of which increase from 0 to ε > 0, reduces less expected utility
loss of each agent in f than in g. That is, ∀i,
4U fi ≤ 4U gi
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with the inequality holding strictly for at least one agent, where 4Uai , a ∈
(f, g) is the reduction of expected utility of agent i in allocation f or g.
Now the systemic Pareto criterion can be defined as follows:
Definition 3. Given the agents are belief persistent, for two alternatives f
and g, f is more systemic Pareto (SP) efficient than g if:
(1) every agent in the society prefers f than g, that is ∀i,∫
S
ui(f)dpi ≥
∫
S
ui(g)dpi,
with the inequality holding strictly for at least one agent.
(2) f involves less systemic risk than g.
Condition (1) guarantees the systemic Pareto criterion is a refinement
of the standard Pareto criterion and Condition (2) gives the reason why
an allocation dominates another one when they are both standard Pareto
efficient.
Proposition 1. Given the agents are belief persistent and the aggregate en-
dowment is constant, betting is more SP efficient than risk sharing.
Proof. For any allocation resulting from voluntary trade, condition (1) is
always satisfied and thus not crucial for justifying that betting is more effi-
cient. Betting dominates risk sharing because betting is less systemic risky
and next I will prove it.
Consider an allocation of betting f . For an agent, the subset Smax
contains all the states he think is most likely to happen, that is Smax =
arg max
s∈S
pi(s). And S
c
max contains all the other states which are not included
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in Smax. The expected utility of him can be expressed as
∫
Smax
ui(f)dpi +∫
Scmax
ui(f)dpi. And for s1 ∈ Smax and s2 ∈ Scmax, ui(f(s1)) ≥ ui(f(s2))
holds for betting. Suppose the probability of a state s0 increases from
0 to ε and ui(f(s0)) ≤ ui(f(s)),∀s 6= s0. Now the expected utility is∫
Smax
ui(f)dpi +
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dp
′
i + pi(s0) ∗ ui(f(s0)). Because the agents are
belief persistent,
∫
Smax
ui(f)dpi is not affected but
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dpi is changed
to
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dp
′
i due to the inclusion of the new state. Hence, the reduction
of expected utility is
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dpi −
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dp
′
i − pi(s0) ∗ ui(f(s0)) =
ε ∗ ui(f(s∗2))− ε ∗ ui(f(s0)) for some s∗2 ∈ Smax.
In an allocation of risk sharing g, the constant endowment guarantees
that ∀s3 ∈ S, ui(f(s1)) ≥ ui(g(s3) ≥ ui(f(s2)) with inequalities holding
strictly for some i. And his expected utility is
∫
S
ui(g)dpi and reduction of
expected utility is
∫
S
ui(g)dpi−
∫
S
ui(g)dp
′
i−pi(s0)∗ui(g(s0)) = ε∗ui(g(s∗3))−
ε ∗ ui(f(s0)) for some s∗3 ∈ S. With ui(f(s0)) = ui(g(s0)) and ui(f(s∗2)) ≤
ui(g(s
∗
3), it is obvious that ε ∗ ui(f(s∗2)) − ε ∗ ui(f(s0)) ≤ ε ∗ ui(g(s∗3)) − ε ∗
ui(f(s0)) with inequality holding strictly for some i. This implies that f is
less systemic risky than g by definition.
4. Discussion
In this section, I will compare the systemic Pareto criterion with no bet-
ting and belief neutral Pareto criteria. Here I offer three angles to distinguish
mine form those two criteria.
4.1. Constant endowment
One seemingly strong assumption applied in this paper is that no ag-
gregate uncertainty in the model. Specifically, the total wealth of society is
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constant before including a new state.
This is contrary to the setting in Brunnermeier et al. (2014) who assigns
a positive or negative externality to trade before evaluating its efficiency.
Belief-neutral Pareto criterion works when the externality is uniformly posi-
tive or negative under every reasonable belief in the combinations of beliefs
of all agents. For example, given negative externality caused by betting re-
ducing social wealth, belief-neutral Pareto criterion is able to identify the
negative externality and claims the betting is inefficient.
However, its ability is compromised when the negative externality pre-
sumption is abandoned. For instance, in the example Speculative Motive of
Brunnermeier et al. (2014), authors assign no clear negative externality to
betting but claim that betting can cause agents to take excessive risk and
impose negative effects on society. This is questionable because a riskier indi-
vidual allocation may involve less systemic risk and does not necessarily mean
that it is inefficient for society. Overall, the rationale behind belief-neutral
Pareto criterion depends on the presumption of externality.
I am not denying that in some cases we can identify its externality of
a trade before it is completed, but this may not be true for most cases.
Usually, we are uncertain of the results caused by a deal and cannot know its
externality in advance. Therefore, I assume there is no aggregate uncertainty
in the model and this helps us to assess social welfare in those cases.
4.2. Parentalism
The belief-neutral Pareto criterion is paternalistic because it ignores in-
dividual preferences when evaluating social welfare. One trouble caused by
Parentalism is that an inefficient allocation f can be undominated by any
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other allocation g. Consider an economy with two agents—Aaron and Ben,
using Aaron’s belief, Aaron is indifferent between f and g while Ben prefers g
to f . In addition, using Ben’s belief, Ben is indifferent between f and g, but
Aaron also thinks that g is better than f . As a result, each one is indifferent
between f and g using his own belief but the society reckons f as inefficient.
To the contrary, the systemic Pareto criterion does not require planner
consider preferences generated by maximizing ones’ expected utilities using
other’s beliefs. The condition (1) in the Proposition ensures that the systemic
Pareto criterion coincides with the notion of standard Pareto principle.
4.3. Robustness
No betting Pareto criterion is not robust to the inclusion of a new state.
For example, f did not dominate g according to no betting Pareto criterion
before a new state was included. However, if a new state which increases the
wealth of every agent arises, then f dominates g after the inclusion of the
new state.
The systemic Pareto criterion also considers the inclusion of a new state
but it is different from the above case. The shock included in this paper which
reduces the wealth of all agents and acts like a ”trembling hand”. Then if f
dominates g according to standard Pareto and f involves less systemic risk
than g, we can conclude that f is systemic Pareto efficient than g.
Furthermore, adding the model a new state which increases the wealth of
every agent is beyond the scope of belief persistence. It is difficult to argue
that such a state is against or for the priors. For example, if the bad king
will give Aaron and Ben a castle when a new state realized. This is hard to
say whether Aaron and Ben are less certain of their defeat or victory when
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they take such a possibility into consideration.
5. Conclusion
This paper proposes a Pareto criterion refinement which takes the risk of
the financial system into account. It shows that under certain assumptions,
perfect risk sharing is not the optimal allocation and can be dominated by
betting, which echoes with the research of Stiglitz (2010b), Beale et al. (2011)
and Haldane and May (2011).
It is worthy of noting that I am not denying the positive effect of risk
sharing in normal situations. When the global economy is stable, for example,
more trade liberalization and financial integration can bring more benefit for
participating countries. What I am suggesting is that when the economy is
ambiguous and there is a small but positive probability that we all suffer, it is
not reasonable to purse perfect risk sharing and forbid betting. Furthermore,
betting may reduce systemic risk and act as a stabilizer of the economy.
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